# ASU RV Cards Round 4 Harvard

## 1AC

### Plan

#### Plan: The United States Federal Government should establish a National Security Court with exclusive jurisdiction over cases pursuant to Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.

### Fear of Islam

#### Contention One: Fear of Islam

#### The upsurge of Anti-Muslim rhetoric threatens to turn the political sphere into an echo chamber of racism, sacrificing any remaining semblance of critical thought on the altar of bipartisanship.

Giroux 11

[Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, formerly Boston University, Miami University, Penn State University, "Breivik's Fundamentalist War on Politics, and Ours," August 3, <http://www.truth-out.org/breiviks-fundamentalist-war-politics-and-ours/1312390288>]

The tragic slayings in Norway raise anew serious questions about domestic terrorism and its roots in right-wing ideology and fundamentalist movements. Breivik's manifesto "2083" and his murderous actions remind us of the degree to which right-wing extremism is more than a minor threat to American security - a fact we have been all too often willing to forget. The foundation of such violence, and the insistent threat it poses to democracy, is not to be found in its most excessive and brutal acts, but in the absolutist worldview that produces it. As the Swedish religion scholar Mattias Gardell insists, "The terrorist attacks in Oslo were not an outburst of irrational madness, but a calculated act of political violence. The carnage was a manifestation of a certain logic that can and should be explained, if we want to avoid a repetition."[5] Elements of such a logic are not only on full display in American society, but are also gaining ground. The influence of extremist and fundamentalist ideologies and worldviews - whether embodied in religion, politics, militarism or the market - can be seen currently in the rhetoric at work at the highest levels of government. How else to explain that just one day after the deficit settlement in Washington, Republican Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado Springs, in an interview with a Denver radio station, referred to President Obama as a "tar baby."[6] It is hard to mistake the racist nature of the use of the term "tar baby," given its long association as a derogatory term for African-Americans. Soon afterward, Pat Buchanan wrote a column that began with a shockingly overt racist comment in which he writes: "Mocked by The Wall Street Journal and Sen. John McCain as the little people of the Harry Potter books, the Tea Party 'Hobbits' are indeed returning to Middle Earth - to nail the coonskin to the wall."[7] What is clear about this type of racist discourse is that it creates a climate where hatred and violence become legitimate options. It also indicates that the violence of extremist rhetoric is alive and well in American politics; yet, it is barely noticed, and produces almost no public outrage. Moreover, this type of fundamentalism and extremism is about more than just the rise of the Tea Party. It is a growing and ominous force in everyday life, politics, and in the media. A rigid, warlike mentality has created an atmosphere in which dialogue is viewed as a weakness and compromise understood as personal failing. As Richard Hofstadter argued over 50 years ago, fundamentalist thinking is predicated on an anti-intellectualism and the refusal to engage other points of view.[8] The other is not confronted as someone worthy of respect, but as an enemy, someone who constitutes a threat, who must be utterly vanquished. Michel Foucault goes further and insists that fundamentalists do not confront the other as: a partner in the search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat.... There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics war, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one's killer instinct as possible.[9] Missing from the fundamentalist toolbox is the necessity for self-reflection, thinking critically about the inevitable limitations of one's arguments, or being morally accountable to the social costs of harboring racist ideologies and pushing policies that serve to deepen racist exclusions, mobilize fear, and legitimate a growing government apparatus of punishment and imprisonment.[10] What connects the moral bankruptcy of right-wing Republicans who embrace violent imagery in order to mobilize their followers with the mindset of extremists like Breivik is that they share a deep romanticization of violence that is valorized by old and new fundamentalisms, whose endpoint is a death-dealing blow to the welfare state, young people, immigrants, Muslims, and others deemed dangerous and, so, "disposable." It is not surprising that Breivik's radical anti-Islamic views draw repeatedly on the work of a number of American extremists, including Andrew Bostrom, David Horowitz and Daniel Pipes. In contrast to comforting media illusions, we are not talking about the emergence of right-wing lone wolfs who explode in a frenzy of hate and violence, but an increasing pervasive - though not yet dominant - fundamentalist worldview that embraces a circle of certainty, evokes a Manichean struggle between good and evil, espouses an anti-intellectual populism, calls for the banishing of critical intellectuals from the academy, and rails against critical academic fields such as postcolonial studies, feminist studies, peace studies and ethnic studies. And while many of these religious and secular fundamentalists may not argue directly for real violence, they spew out a steady stream of hatred that created the conditions for such violence. I am not suggesting that Breivik's actions can be linked directly to right-wing extremism in the Congress and broader society, but it is not altogether unjust to suggest that what they share are a number of core concerns, including a view of immigrants as a threat to American nationalism, an embrace of anti-Muslim rhetoric, a strong espousal of militarism, market fundamentalism, hyper-nationalism and support for a host of retrograde social policies that embrace weakening unions, the rolling back of women's rights, and a deep distrust of equality as a foundation of democracy itself.[11] Chris Hedges outlines the elements of such a fundamentalism when he writes: Fundamentalists have no interest in history, culture or social or linguistic differences.... They are provincials.... They peddle a route to assured collective deliverance. And they sanction violence and the physical extermination of other human beings to get there. All fundamentalists worship the same gods - themselves. They worship the future prospect of their own empowerment. They view this empowerment as a necessity for the advancement and protection of civilization or the Christian state. They sanctify the nation. They hold up the ability the industrial state has handed to them as a group and as individuals to shape the world according to their vision as evidence of their own superiority.... The self-absorbed world view of these fundamentalists brings smiles of indulgence from the corporatists who profit, at our expense, from the obliteration of moral and intellectual inquiry.[12] At work here is a moral and political absolutism that more and more dehumanizes young people, immigrants, feminists, Muslims, and others relegated to the outside of the narrow parameters of a public sphere preserved for white, Christian and male citizens. Breivik acted upon his hatred of Muslims, leftists and immigrants by murdering young people whose activities at a Labor Party Camp suggested they might usher in a future at odds with his deeply racist and authoritarian views. As Scott Shane, writing in The New York Times, put it, and it bears repeating, Breivik, "was deeply influenced by a small group of American bloggers and writers who have warned for years about the threat from Islam."[13] Breivik names, among others, the right-wing extremist Pamela Geller, "who has called President Obama 'President Jihad' and claimed that Arab language classes are a plot to subvert the United States."[14] More recently, Geller's xenophobic blog, Atlas Shrugs, has repeatedly attempted, "to unearth Obama's relationship to Islam [and prove that] Islam is a political ideology [that is] incompatible with democracy."[15] Geller's racist and hate-filled blog implied that Breivik's attack on the Labor youth camp may have been somehow justified because, as she puts it, "the victims would have grown up to become 'future leaders of the party responsible for flooding Norway with Muslims who refuse to assimilate, who commit major violence against Norwegian natives including violent gang rapes, with impunity, and who live on the dole."[16] Atlas vomits! As ThinkProgress' Lee Fang points out, Geller attempts to prove her point by posting a picture taken on the island camp a few hours before Breivik's murderous rampage, and she writes, without any sense of remorse, "Note the faces which are more Mlddle [sic] Easter or mixed than pure Norwegian."[17] While such shocking expressions of racism cannot be directly connected to all forms of fundamentalism, there is nothing in those who espouse this worldview that renders them open or willing to exercise the judgment, critical inquiry, and thoughtfulness necessary to counter and resist such views and the violence to which they often lead. Such worldviews operate on the side of certainty, wrap themselves in a logic that is considered unquestionable, refuse compromise and dialogue, and often invoke a militarized vocabulary to define themselves as soldiers fighting a war for Western civilization. This is a worldview in which ignorance and impotence join with violence, sanctified by a fundamentalism that thrives on conformity and authoritarian populism. Breivik was not a typical right-wing terrorist. He refused to endorse a strategy that made a claim for racial superiority on biological grounds; more specifically, he recognized that it was not wise tactically, "to oppose immigration and Islam on racial grounds (an argument that would attract few people.)"[18] Instead, he admired and adopted an ideology from those far-right groups that revised old racist beliefs and adopted a new anti-Muslim narrative in which immigrants and those deemed other, "are not biologically inferior, but they are culturally incompatible."[19] In this case, cultural difference rather than biological degeneration is viewed as a threat to democracy.[20] While most right-wing politicians, individuals and groups denounce the horrendous violence perpetrated by Breivik, they nonetheless produce and contribute to a culture of violence and rhetoric of demonization that undermines respect for difference, democratic values, and a capacious notion of personal and social responsibility. As recently stated in a study by the Anti-Defamation League: The hateful rhetoric around the immigration debate has gone beyond the rallies, lobbying and media appearances by anti-immigration advocates. A number of media personalities in television and radio, as well as political leaders, have adopted the same language when discussing immigration issues in this country. These extend from [former] "national TV correspondent Lou Dobbs to more extreme political commentator Patrick Buchanan to local radio personalities to members of Congress such as Tom Tancredo and Steve King ... the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric has permeated the culture in our country."[21] There are few degrees of separation between far-right extremists such as the late Madeleine Cosman, an alleged medical lawyer, and radio and TV personality Lou Dobbs, yet both have argued that Mexican immigrants are criminals and carriers of diseases such as leprosy. This type of hysterical xenophobia can also be found in the words and actions of New York Republican Rep. Peter T. King, who, as chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, has opened hearings on the radicalization of Muslim Americans. This type of racist hysteria (that precludes investigation of other forms of radicalization) is commonplace in America, and is aided and abetted by conservatives such as Buchanan, who writes columns such as "Say goodbye to Los Angeles" filled with apocalyptic visions of the United States being taken over by people of color.[22] This type of rhetoric is easy politics. As such, it is widely used in the United States, and can also be found in the work of the late Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington, [23] anti-Muslim bloggers, Christian fundamentalists, Fox News commentators and in anti-immigration policies initiated in a variety of states, with one of the most pernicious examples introduced by state legislators in Arizona. Fundamentalism is as home grown as the Ku Klux Klan and white militia groups, and can be found across a range of groups extending from the Christian right to secular fundamentalists such as Sam Harris.[24] This type of bigotry and the life-crushing policies it produces can give rise to and spread like a disease; its targets seem to multiply every day in the United States. Indeed, one could argue that the only successful (though hardly cost-effective) war the United States has waged since the 1980's has been against poor men of color, who now represent 70 percent of all inmates in US prisons.[25] Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) populations are indeed another target of hate, captured for example in one of Buchanan's recent columns, in which he writes: "What is the moral basis of the argument that homosexuality is normal, natural and healthy? In recent years, it has been associated with high levels of AIDS and enteric diseases, and from obits in gay newspapers, early death. Where is the successful society where homosexual marriage was normal?"[26] There is also the war on youth, which is now in high gear with the implosion of social safety nets, decent housing, health care and the simultaneous rise of the punishing state, this the result of the conservative takeover of a number of state legislators and governorships by radical conservatives and the control of the House of Representatives by right-wing extremists. This isn't the kind of direct warfare we saw in Norway, but it is warfare just the same, less spectacular in the short run, but with more casualties in the long run. Consider the actions of Jan Brewer, the governor of Arizona, in, "spearheading a bill to eliminate KidsCare, the state's Medicaid Program for children ... though twenty three percent of Arizona's children live in poverty."[27] What does one say about Gov. Paul LePage of Maine, who, "recently signed into law a bill that eases child labor laws, lowering restrictions on the hours and days teenagers can work."[28] It gets worse. Nevada Democratic Sen. Harry Reid signaled the current extremism of the Republican Party by highlighting that the legislation they have recently introduced would cut or eliminate Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Over 1.7 million kids would lose health insurance by 2016.[29] Common Dreams reported that, "GOP Florida lawmakers have rejected over $50 million in much-needed federal child-abuse prevention money because it was part of Obama's healthcare reform package."[30] Violence becomes news when its most extreme registers erupt in waves of bloodshed. Yet, there is another kind of violence that can rightfully be viewed as a form of domestic terrorism. It can be seen in an array of statistics that point to the current war on youth: 43.6 millions Americans live in poverty and one child in five is poor; "infant mortality, low birth weight and child deaths under five are ranked higher in the United States as compared to other Western nations and Japan. Among Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, only Mexico, Turkey and the Slovak Republic have higher infant mortality than the U.S."[31] As a result of the corruption and crimes of bankers, Wall Street, and the right-wing politicians who have bailed them out and legitimated the deregulatory policies that produced such hardships, millions of people are unemployed and have lost their homes, all of which impacts not just on adults, but on generations of young people condemned to poverty, homelessness, unemployment and a future without hope. This is the violence legitimated by right-wing conservative policies, which contribute to shocking levels of inequality in which the wealth of Hispanics and blacks fell by 66 percent and 55 percent, respectively, between 2005 and 2009. The United States has the highest inequality and poverty rate among the industrialized nations. Such statistics point to policies that are not simply mean-spirited; they are cruel, sadistic and dishonor the government's obligations to young people and politically marginalized populations. Economist Paul Krugman rightly claims that, "The G.O.P. budget plan isn't a good-faith effort to put America's fiscal house in order; it's voodoo economics, with an extra dose of fantasy, and a large helping of mean-spiritedness."[32] Krugman goes further and argues that the American government is being held hostage by a group of Republican extremists who purposely want to make government dysfunctional. Far-right zealots such a Michele Bachmann and her conservative evangelical compatriots embody a mode of fundamentalism that promotes gay-bashing, a disdain for social protections and a deep hatred of government, which is rooted less in political and economic analyses than in biblical stricture and religious values.[33] Yet, such commitments are not marginal to American politics. For example, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) stated that, "After years of discussions and months of negotiations, I have little question that as long as this president is in the Oval Office, a real solution is unattainable."[34] There is more than a covert racism at work here, given the extremist views about Obama that inform much of the Republican Party, there is also a cult of certainty that has given political extremism a degree of normalcy, while at the same time indicating the degree to which such thought now permeates American society. In fact, absolutist thought is now driving official state and federal policy and pushing an alleged liberal Obama to a far-right position, all in the name of a cowardly appeal to bipartisanship and a deeply flawed notion of consensus. Not only is the power of market-driven casino capitalism at its zenith, but a culture of fundamentalism has become the driving force in American politics that is only a few degrees away from an outright embrace of a 21st century authoritarianism. What is interesting, and quite frightening, about Krugman's analysis of the growing fundamentalism and religiosity of American politics is his insightful claim that such a move is being abetted by a dominant media apparatus that views extremist ideas within what he calls a "cult of balance," in which such views are treated as just one more legitimate opinion. Listen to Brian Williams, the NBC News anchor, on any given night, and you get firsthand one of the worst offenders of the cult of balance. Krugman is worth citing on this issue. He writes: News reports portray the parties as equally intransigent; pundits fantasize about some kind of "centrist" uprising, as if the problem was too much partisanship on both sides. Some of us have long complained about the cult of "balance," the insistence on portraying both parties as equally wrong and equally at fault on any issue, never mind the facts. I joked long ago that if one party declared that the earth was flat, the headlines would read, "Views Differ on Shape of Planet." But would that cult still rule in a situation as stark as the one we now face, in which one party is clearly engaged in blackmail and the other is dickering over the size of the ransom? The answer, it turns out, is yes. And this is no laughing matter: The cult of balance has played an important role in bringing us to the edge of disaster. For when reporting on political disputes always implies that both sides are to blame, there is no penalty for extremism.[35] All of which is to say that there is another side to right-wing fundamentalism that needs to be addressed outside of its xenophobic, homophobic, antigovernment, antifeminist and youth-hating beliefs, which have become increasingly normalized, legitimated and defined loosely as just another view in American society. Yet, this is about more than the rise of a hate-filled fundamentalism and populist anti-intellectualism that scorns debate, dialogue and critical exchange. It is also symptomatic of the end of politics, and, by default, signals the death knell of democracy itself. Politics becomes moribund when dialogue, critical exchange, reasoned arguments, facts, logic and critical modes of education become objects of derision and contempt. Right-wing extremism is nourished when the formative culture that makes democracy possible is defunded, commercialized and diminished - when it is eroded and increasingly ceases to exist. Right-wing extremism and the fundamentalist logic it embraces is not merely a security threat; it does not simply produce terrorists. It actively wages a war on the very possibility of judgment, informed argument and critical agency itself. It opens the door for lies and omissions parading as truth, ignorance celebrated as informed reason and the dismissal of science as just another worthy opinion. In the end, violence emerges as a legitimate strategy to weed out those not on the side of an unquestioning moralism. Education redefined as training, fear driven by political illiteracy and authoritarian populism parading as the will of the people speak to what philosopher Hannah Arendt once called "dark times," to refer to that period in history in which the forces of totalitarianism and fascism extinguished reason, thoughtful exchange, discerning judgments, justice and truth. We are once again in on the brink of "dark times" and the clock is not merely ticking. The alarm is blaring, and yet the American public refuses to wake from a nightmare that is about to become a dreadful and punishing reality. Of course, history is open, and we have witnessed in Egypt, Iran, Syria, Greece and other countries, men, women and young people who have refused the established and beckoning forms of authoritarianism, giving rise to collective revolts that display immense courage and hope. It is past time for Americans to look beyond existing forms of leadership, the tired vocabularies of established political parties, the thoughtless stenography dispersed by mainstream media and the official view of democracy as just another form of consumerism. It is time to look to those struggles abroad that both embrace democracy and embody a form of civic courage in which thinking and morality inform each other in support of a world where young people can flourish, politics becomes a noble practice and democracy has a future.

#### This is evident in status quo detention policy. Indefinite detention represents an attempt to single out, debase and eradicate Muslim culture.

Elver, Research Professor of Global Studies at the University of California Santa Barbara, ‘12

[Hilal, “Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia”, TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol. 21, Spring 2012, RSR]

The combination of prolonged illegal detention, a new interpretation of ¶ torture, and cruel interrogation practices has led to widespread criticism in ¶ the United States and abroad, both by human rights organizations and by ¶ foreign governments.149 “According to a report by Human Rights First, close ¶ to one hundred people have died in U.S. custody; the Pentagon classifies ¶ thirty-four of those cases as criminal homicides. At least eight of those people ¶ were literally tortured to death.”150 The most shocking treatment was ¶ exposed in photographs from Abu Ghraib that were published in mainstream ¶ media in the United States and worldwide.151 Various human rights ¶ organizations and the Pentagon rushed to investigate the atrocities. The ¶ resulting reports were revealing. Abuses were widespread, not only in Iraq ¶ but in Afghanistan and Guantanamo as well.¶ 152 This incident is considered ¶ something of a game changer in relation to the popularity of the Iraq war. ¶ After Abu Ghraib, much of the American public lost its confidence in military ¶ practices. This was a big turning point against the Bush Administration ¶ among the American political establishment. Right after this incident,¶ Senator McCain and his supporters introduced an anti-torture amendment. ¶ However, despite all these pictures that became disturbing icons of the¶ Bush Administration’s policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo, the ¶ general public did not appreciate a deeper problematic aspect of these ¶ practices: “U.S. soldiers and interrogators singled out Islamic culture in their ¶ efforts to humiliate and mistreat prisoners.”153 “The experiences of U.S. ¶ Captain James Yee, a West Point graduate and convert to Islam, offer ¶ compelling evidence of how, throughout the post-9/11 period, antagonism ¶ toward prisoners, and efforts to break them, rested upon the debasement of ¶ Muslim practices and religious items.”154 Another disturbing incident¶ happened in Afghanistan. American soldiers ¶ burned and desecrated the bodies of two Taliban fighters, ¶ publicly placing their corpses “facing west,” in an apparent, deliberate mocking of the Islamic requirement to face Mecca ¶ during prayer. Elsewhere, female soldiers have been used to ¶ humiliate detainees by touching them and by making them ¶ undress . . . and [using] sexually provocative tactics . . . meant ¶ to violate Muslim taboos about contact between the sexes and ¶ religious purity.155¶ Using woman interrogators in such a way is also extremely humiliating ¶ for American female military officers, but again this issue never became a ¶ public concern as subordination and humiliation and dehumanization of ¶ women in the military. To draw a fine line between the war on terror and a ¶ war on Islam obviously was not one of the concerns of the American military. ¶ Moreover, these tactics have been used to dehumanize detainees, using their ¶ belief as a weapon against them.156 In Iraq, the attitudes of American ¶ soldiers to the Iraqi people provide abundant evidence that racial ¶ subordination of the Iraqi people was common knowledge.

#### Our detention policy is founded upon the basis of racial profiling. It creates a perpetual security state that dehumanizes the Brown Other.

Butler, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California at Berkeley, ‘3

[Judith, “INDEFINITE DETENTION”, La Rivista del Manifesto, Numero 35, 2003, RSR]

The license to brand and categorize and detain on the basis of suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of “deeming,” is potentially enormous. We have already seen it at work in racial profiling, in the detention of hundreds of Arab residents or Arab-American citizens, sometimes on the basis of last names alone; the attacks on individuals of Middle-East descent on U.S. streets, and the targeting of Arab-American professors on campuses. Indeed, when Rumsfeld has sent the U.S. into periodic panics or “alerts,” he has not told the population what to look out for, but only to have a heightened awareness of suspicious activity. This objectless panic translates too quickly into suspicion of all dark skinned peoples, especially those who are Arab, or appear to look so to a population not always well-versed in making visual distinctions, say, between Sikhs and Muslims or, indeed, Sephardic or Arab Jews and Pakistani-Americans.. Although “deeming” someone dangerous is considered a state prerogative in these discussions, it is also a potential license for prejudicial perception and a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and judging, that is, prejudicial forms of suspicion in the name of national security. A population of Islamic peoples, or those taken to be Islamic, becomes targeted by this government mandate to be on heightened alert, with the effect that the Arab population in the U.S. becomes visually rounded up, stared down, watched, hounded and monitored by a group of citizens who understand themselves as foot soldiers in the war against terrorism. What kind of public culture is being created when a certain “indefinite containment” takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airplanes, on the street, on the workplace. A falafel restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly the flag becomes read as a sign of sympathy with Al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but which nevertheless rules public culture - and business interests - at this time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed dangerous, and no dangerous acts need to be shown or proven to anyone to establish this as true, then the state constitutes the detained population unilaterally, taking them out of the jurisdiction of the law, depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national and international law are entitled. These are surely populations that are not subjects, humans who are not conceptualized within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so humans who are not humans. We saw evidence for this derealization of the human in the photos released by the Department of Defense of the shackled bodies in Guantanamo.

#### The lack of legal protections risks of a repeat of Korematsu. Detention risks racialized dehumanization outside the sphere of law.

Muller, George R. Ward Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law, ‘3

[Eric, “Inference or Impact? ¶ Racial Profiling and the Internment’s ¶ True Legacy”, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 2003, RSR]

On the other hand, however, there are plenty of reasons to worry that time has ¶ not created sufficient firebreaks in the legal landscape to keep the flame of ¶ minimal race- or ethnicity-based intrusions from blazing out of control. First, and perhaps most importantly, people in positions of power too often seem to have ¶ missed the last sixty years’ worth of social learning. In a single week in February ¶ of 2003, two Members of Congress from my home state of North Carolina went ¶ public with simply extraordinary views on the Japanese American internment and ¶ on the suspiciousness of Arab Americans. Fielding questions after a speech on ¶ terrorism at the Heritage Foundation, Representative Sue Myrick spoke about ¶ dangers within the country. She said, “You know, and this can be misconstrued, ¶ but honest to goodness [my husband] Ed and I for years, for 20 years, have been ¶ saying, ‘You know, look at who runs all the convenience stores across the ¶ country.’ Every little town you go into, you know?”125 Not to be outdone, ¶ Representative Howard Coble, speaking on a radio talk show a few days later, ¶ volunteered that he supported Franklin Roosevelt’s policy of internment for ¶ Japanese Americans during World War II. Trotting out a long-discredited ¶ rationale for the internment, Coble added that “[f]or many of these Japanese ¶ Americans, it wasn’t safe for them to be out on the street.”126 In other words, ¶ Japanese Americans were imprisoned for their own good. Representative Coble is ¶ the Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and ¶ Homeland Security, the committee with primary oversight of the new Department ¶ of Homeland Security. I would not trust him or Representative Myrick to police ¶ the line between minimal and severe race- and ethnicity-based government actions. ¶ In addition, while it is true that the larger legal landscape has changed ¶ significantly in the last sixty years, the changes have come more slowly at the level ¶ of actual police-citizen interactions—precisely the spot where many race- and ¶ ethnicity-based intrusions are most likely to occur. The Supreme Court has shown ¶ decidedly little interest in scrutinizing the motivations of police officers when they ¶ make stops, ask questions, and perform frisks and searches.127 The Supreme Court ¶ has also removed or watered down many of the incentives for police compliance ¶ with its rules on criminal investigations, with the result that actual police conduct ¶ in the field may be more intrusive than what “the law” officially allows.128¶ More importantly, most interactions between law enforcement agents and ¶ citizens happen outside of public scrutiny, and therefore largely outside of public ¶ accountability. The government has insisted on secrecy in as many of its post September 11 dealings as possible, including immigration hearings, where ¶ allegations of excess might be heard and tested.129 And in any case, law ¶ enforcement officers benefit from the rich doctrine of good-faith immunity from constitutional tort liability that the courts have created and strengthened for them ¶ over several decades.130 Thus, to the extent that we would expect the scrutiny of an ¶ energetic press and a curious public to serve as a firebreak, there will be a good ¶ deal less of that than is likely necessary. ¶ These are, moreover, risks on which we do not need to speculate. In April of ¶ 2003, the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General made public a ¶ report on the treatment of aliens held on immigration charges in connection with ¶ the investigation of the September 11 attacks.131 It is a depressing document. ¶ Seven hundred sixty-two aliens, almost exclusively Arab and Muslim,132 were ¶ arrested, mostly on immigration charges, between September of 2001 and July of ¶ 2002.133 Many of these aliens came under suspicion primarily because of their ¶ national origin.134 Yet the suspicion hardly led to just minimal intrusions. They ¶ led rather to an almost Kafka-esque series of escalating burdens, all imposed by a ¶ law enforcement and corrections system that did not seem interested in drawing ¶ distinctions among the aliens or protecting their rights. ¶ First, and perhaps most notably, the aliens were not simply questioned or ¶ watched; they were arrested and detained. Once it arrested them, the FBI made ¶ little effort to distinguish between those who were subjects of an actual terrorism ¶ investigation and those who were detained solely for immigration violations.135¶ The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) routinely failed to serve the ¶ detainees with timely notices of the charges under which it was holding them.136¶ And the Justice Department decided that no detainee who was “of interest” to the ¶ FBI in relation to terrorism—an exceedingly loosely defined category—could be ¶ released from custody until first “cleared” of terrorism suspicion.137 The clearance ¶ process took an average of eighty days, far longer than the “few days” that the ¶ Justice Department had anticipated.138 Justice Department officials knew of these ¶ delays, but did nothing.139¶ The burdens on the September 11 detainees did not end there. The INS ¶ adopted a blanket policy of refusing them release on bond, and supported this ¶ policy with boilerplate affidavits that recited general national security concerns but ¶ averred nothing specific to any individual detainee’s case.140 And this “no bond” policy kept the detainees locked up in conditions that were, in many cases, ¶ horrifying. For several weeks after September 11, they were completely cut off ¶ from the outside world, under a total communications blackout.141 Once allowed ¶ contact with the outside world, the contact was spotty and difficult to obtain, even ¶ with legal counsel.142 Perhaps most disturbingly, many of the September 11 ¶ detainees were subject to a pattern of physical and verbal abuse by some ¶ correctional officers, including name-calling, excessive physical force and ¶ restraint, twenty-four-hour-per-day exposure to fluorescent light, and inadequate ¶ medical treatment and recreation.143 In the few months after the horror of ¶ September 11, the flame of discrimination simply jumped the firebreaks in the ¶ legal landscape that were supposed to control it.

#### Muslim Otherization creates a dyad between the faiths, making global war inevitable.

Batur, Professor of Sociology and Director of Environmental Studies at Vassar College, ‘7

[Pinar, “Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide”, Handbook of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, 2007, RSR]

Albert Memmi argued that “We have no idea what the colonized would have been without colonization, but we certainly see what happened as a result of it”(Memmi, 1965: 114). Events surrounding Iraq and Katrina provide three critical points regarding global racism. The first one is that segregation, exclusion, and genocide are closely related and facilitated by institutions employing the white racial frame to legitimize their ideologies and actions. The second one is the continuation of violence, either sporadically or systematically, with single- minded determination from segregation, to exclusion, to genocide. The third point is that legitimization and justification of violence is embedded in the resignation that global racism will not alter its course, and there is no way to challenge global racism. Together these three points facilitate the base for war and genocide In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that “the clash of civilizations will domi- nate global politics”(Huntington 1993: 22). He declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntington’s end of ideology meant the West is now expected to confront the Confucian-Islamic “other.” Huntington intoned “Islam has bloody borders,” and he expected the West to develop cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the “Confucian-Islamic” civilizations, by exploiting the conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded with September 11. The new color line means “we hate them not because of what they do, but because of who they are and what they believe in.”

#### The way we frame the Other is a pre-condition to all violence.

Collins and Glover, 2002

[John Collins, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language]

As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that **language matters** in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: **its use**, by political and military leaders, **leads directly to violence in the form of war,** mass murder (**in­cluding genocide**), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, **if the world ever witnesses a nuclea**r holocaust, it **will** probably **be because leaders** in more than one country have **succeeded in convincing** their **people**, through the use of political language, **that** the **use of nuclear weapons and**, if necessary, **the destruction of the earth** itself, **is justifiable.** From our perspective, then, **every act of political violence**—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—**is** intimately linked **with the use of language**. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “**manufacturing consent**” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; **people are more likely to sup­port** acts of **violence** committed in their name **if** the **recipients** of the violence **have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom**.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; **the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages,** besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

### Solvency

#### Contention Two: Solvency

#### The national security court would ensure defendants’ rights and solve status quo abuse.

Sulmasy, Commander and associate professor of law at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, ‘10

[Glenn, “Create a Hybrid Court”, 11-18-10, The New York Times,
<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/18/prosecuting-terrorists-in-federal-court/create-a-hybrid-court>, RSR]

A National Security Court System (as part of a broader FISA court) would offer the best means to achieve a proper balance between providing for national security and bringing terrorists to justice.¶ This system would be overseen by the Justice Department and have civilian judges who are experts in this area of the law. These courts, with three to five judge panels, would be held on military bases within the United States (such as Ft. Leavenworth) or utilize the facilities at Guantanamo, use the rules of evidence already employed in the military commissions, provide for a habeas appeal to one of these judges within three months of capture, ensure due process, try every detainee within one year from capture (and try all of the detainees currently held in Guantanamo and perhaps Bagram), and provide the right to appeal. Finally, the legislation authorizing this court system should have a sunset provision of five years.¶ Just as the U.S. and our allies have adapted strategically and tactically to combating international terror, it is time to create a new system to prosecute fighters in this kind of conflict.

#### Combating fear of Islam requires access to the political sphere – prevents the right wing takeover of the status quo.

Yazdiha, PhD in Sociology at the University of North Carolina, ‘13

[Haj, “Law as Movement Strategy: How the¶ Islamophobia Movement Institutionalizes¶ Fear Through Legislation”, Social Movement Studies, 2013, RSR]

First, the successful use of law as strategy brings Islamophobia into an elite political¶ sphere. Any movement to successfully counter Islamophobia’s legislative efforts must¶ also gain access to the political arena and the support of political elites. This shift in the¶ movement’s playing field raises questions about the viable tactics of attempted counter-¶ movements. How might the successful use of law as strategy legitimize a movement,¶ politically incorporating and empowering the movement, such that it cannot be directly¶ challenged?¶ Similarly, as the political process model suggests, a movement’s acquisition of elite¶ allies can provide greater political opportunities. The Islamophobia movement’s¶ legislative successes have garnered the support of political insiders like Newt Gingrich¶ and Michelle Bachmann, which only drives further political access, opportunity and¶ power. Insofar as¶ Fear, Inc.¶ suggests that elites’ support is given in exchange for political¶ donations, further research might consider the temporal relationship between resources elite allies and political opportunity. To what extent is the successful use of law as strategy¶ dependent upon fluid resources?¶ Finally, though less readily measurable, a shift in broader discourse such as the notable¶ increase in¶ New York Times¶ articles about Sharia is a significant measure of a movement’s¶ impact. A shift in cultural consciousness and discourse is as much a goal of the¶ Islamophobia movement as is its legislative gains. Furthermore, these broader cultural¶ successes create further discursive opportunities on which movements can build and¶ through which related movements can be framed.

#### The law can help people --- reformism is empirically more successful than revolutionary withdrawal.

Kazin, Professor of History at Georgetown University, ‘11

[Michael, Has the US Left Made a Difference, Dissent Spring p. 52-54]

But when political radicals made a big difference, they generally did so as decidedly junior partners in a coalition driven by establishment reformers. Abolitionists did not achieve their goal until midway through the Civil War, when Abraham Lincoln and his fellow Republicans realized that the promise of emancipation could speed victory for the North. Militant unionists were not able to gain a measure of power in mines, factories, and on the waterfront until Franklin Roosevelt needed labor votes during the New Deal. Only when Lyndon Johnson and other liberal Democrats conquered their fears of disorder and gave up on the white South could the black freedom movement celebrate passage of the civil rights and voting rights acts. For a political movement to gain any major goal, it needs to win over a section of the governing elite (it doesn’t hurt to gain support from some wealthy philanthropists as well). Only on a handful of occasions has the Left achieved such a victory, and never under its own name. The divergence between political marginality and cultural influence stems, in part, from the kinds of people who have been the mainstays of the American Left. During just one period of about four decades—from the late 1870s to the end of the First World War— could radicals authentically claim to represent more than a tiny number of Americans who belonged to what was, and remains, the majority of the population: white Christians from the working and lower-middle class. At the time, this group included Americans from various trades and regions who condemned growing corporations for controlling the marketplace, corrupting politicians, and degrading civic morality. But this period ended after the First World War—due partly to the epochal split in the international socialist movement. Radicals lost most of the constituency they had gained among ordinary white Christians and have never been able to regain it. Thus, the wageearning masses who voted for Socialist, Communist, and Labor parties elsewhere in the industrial world were almost entirely lost to the American Left—and deeply skeptical about the vision of solidarity that inspired the great welfare states of Europe. Both before and after this period, the public face and voice of the Left emanated from an uneasy alliance: between men and women from elite backgrounds and those from such groups as Jewish immigrant workers and plebeian blacks whom most Americans viewed as dangerous outsiders. This was true in the abolitionist movement—when such New England brahmins as Wendell Phillips and Maria Weston Chapman fought alongside Frederick Douglass and Sojourner Truth. And it was also the case in the New Left of the 1960s, an unsustainable alliance of white students from elite colleges and black people like Fannie Lou Hamer and Huey Newton from the ranks of the working poor. It has always been difficult for these top and- bottom insurgencies to present themselves as plausible alternatives to the major parties, to convince more than a small minority of voters to embrace their program for sweeping change. Radicals did help to catalyze mass movements. But furious internal conflicts, a penchant for dogmatism, and hostility toward both nationalism and organized religion helped make the political Left a taste few Americans cared to acquire. However, some of the same qualities that alienated leftists from the electorate made them pioneers in generating an alluringly rebellious culture. Talented orators, writers, artists, and academics associated with the Left put forth new ideas and lifestyles that stirred the imagination of many Americans, particularly young ones, who felt stifled by orthodox values and social hierarchies. These ideological pioneers also influenced forces around the world that adapted the culture of the U.S. Left to their own purposes—from the early sprouts of socialism and feminism in the1830s to the subcultures of black power, radical feminism, and gay liberation in the 1960s and 1970s. Radical ideas about race, gender, sexuality, and social justice did not need to win votes to become popular. They just required an audience. And leftists who were able to articulate or represent their views in creative ways often found one. Arts created to serve political ends are always vulnerable to criticism. Indeed, some radicals deliberately gave up their search for the sublime to concentrate on the merely persuasive. But as George Orwell, no aesthetic slouch, observed, “the opinion that art should have nothing to do with politics is itself a political attitude.” In a sense, the radicals who made the most difference in U.S. history were not that radical at all. What most demanded, in essence, was the fulfillment of two ideals their fellow Americans already cherished: individual freedom and communal responsibility. In 1875, Robert Schilling, a German immigrant who was an official in the coopers, or caskmakers, union, reflected on why socialists were making so little headway among the hard-working citizenry: ….everything that smacks in the least of a curtailment of personal or individual liberty is most obnoxious to [Americans]. They believe that every individual should be permitted to do what and how it pleases, as long as the rights and liberties of others are not injured or infringed upon. [But] this personal liberty must be surrendered and placed under the control of the State, under a government such as proposed by the social Democracy. Most American radicals grasped this simple truth. They demanded that the promise of individual rights be realized in everyday life and encouraged suspicion of the words and power of all manner of authorities—political, economic, and religious. Abolitionists, feminists, savvy Marxists all quoted the words of the Declaration of Independence, the most popular document in the national canon. Of course, leftists did not champion self-reliance, the notion that an individual is entirely responsible for his or her own fortunes. But they did uphold the modernist vision that Americans should be free to pursue happiness unfettered by inherited hierarchies and identities. At the same time, the U.S. Left—like its counterparts around the world—struggled to establish a new order animated by a desire for social fraternity. The labor motto “An injury to one is an injury to all” rippled far beyond picket lines and marches of the unemployed. But American leftists who articulated this credo successfully did so in a patriotic and often religious key, rather than by preaching the grim inevitability of class struggle. Such radical social gospelers as Harriet Beecher Stowe, Edward Bellamy, and Martin Luther King, Jr., gained more influence than did those organizers who espoused secular, Marxian views. Particularly during times of economic hardship and war, radicals promoted collectivist ends by appealing to the wisdom of “the people” at large. To gain a sympathetic hearing, the Left always had to demand that the national faith apply equally to everyone and oppose those who wanted to reserve its use for privileged groups and undemocratic causes. But it was not always possible to wrap a movement’s destiny in the flag. “America is a trap,” writes the critic Greil Marcus, “its promises and dreams…are too much to live up to and too much to escape.”

#### The aff’s discursive act successfully breaks down myths regarding Islam. This makes peaceful coexistence possible.

Nimer, Professor at the American University School of International Service in International Peace and Conflict Resolution , ‘7

[Mohamed, “Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Islamophobia and Anti-Americanism”, PRINCE ALWALEED BIN TALAL¶ CENTER FOR MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING¶ GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, Islamophobia and the Challenges of Pluralism in the 21st Century, 2007, RSR]

Dialogue for the purpose of exposing myths and forging a common understanding is a must to assure a peaceful future. Richard Cizik, a leader in the¶ National Association of Evangelicals movement warns Muslims against equating¶ evangelicals with fundamentalist Christians.11 Muslims have complained for so¶ long that Western academics and journalists invented the term fundamentalist¶ Islam and equate its characteristics with profiles of practicing Muslims, equate¶ those with extremists, and extremists with terrorists. Following the Iranian¶ Revolution in 1979 such assumptions were applied to Shia Muslims and after¶ 9/11 Sunnis became the main villains.¶ Charting the way out of stereotyping and communication based on ignorant profiling, Muslims, Christians, and Jews must acknowledge their Abrahamic¶ roots as one strong foundation for communication between all followers of these¶ three religions. Religious scriptures of all major world religion enunciate the golden¶ rule, which simply recommends treating others as one would like to be treated.¶ This universal principle offers a solid moral ground for peaceful coexistence.¶ Political realists may think such a lofty idea will not change the nature of¶ international relations, which, in their view, are based on mistrust, power and¶ interest. But those who believe in the free will of human beings may disagree.¶ Therefore, there is reason to support a global discourse premised on a shared¶ future. Within this framework, various sub-discourses may prove fruitful.

#### We must reject complicity with racism – no instance is too small.

Barndt 91

[Joseph. NYC pastor and author, “Crossroads; Dismantling Racism” p. 219, date accessed: 7/8/2010] AJK

To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences, restraints and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people seperate from each other in our seperate prisons. We are all prevented from achieving human potential that God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhumane and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down once and for all, the walls of racism.

#### Our commitment to social justice can transform foreign policy - viewing the identity of the state as static abandons a critical opportunity to challenge domination

Schwedler et. al 11

[Jillian Schwedler teaches political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst Josh Stacher is an assistant professor of political science at Kent State University Stacey Philbrick Yadav is the coordinator of the Middle Eastern Studies program and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges Jadaliyya June 10 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1826/three-powerfully-wrong\_and-wrongly-powerful\_americ]

We can expect that Islamists are likely to point out the inconsistencies in our policies, most acutely (but not exclusively) with regard to Israel. It is, of course, perfectly reasonable to question the casual way in which US and Israeli interests have for so long been conflated. Governments accountable to emboldened electorates—regardless of the role played by Islamists—are likely to push that conversation along. But the justification of US policy inconsistencies rests on a more foundational myth about the very nature of interests as enduring and self-evident. The truth? ? There are no US interests. It is impossible to speak of interests in the absence of collective identities. One can describe the interests of a group, or identify one’s interest as a member of a collective, but the idea that individuals (let alone states) have interests that exist outside of these categories of belonging just doesn’t hold up. Speaking of “US interests” masks this fact with what sounds like a commonsensical idea: we have to look after our interests first. But in whose interest—precisely—does the government of the United States pursue a given policy? The “average” citizen (as if there is such a thing)? Congressional lobbyists? The contractors who directly profit from our relations with foreign regimes? Rather than viewing this as a polemical bête noir, this is a question that we should be asking regularly, as part of the practice of engaged citizenship. If we view the United States as a democracy, then we ought to see the origin of US policy as the collective will of the demos that US institutions reflect, and we can work to change that collective will or at least represent it more accurately. If, by contrast, we view the United States as a plutocracy, we might find the answer in a particular constellation of specific industries, stakeholders, etc., and pursue a strategy of lobbying, targeted boycott, etc. Either approach requires that we ask how interests come to be articulated by people who see themselves as sharing something essential in common. When people accept the argument that inconsistencies in US policies regarding the Arab uprisings are an unavoidable consequence of “our vital national interests,” they are ceding serious ground. They are suggesting that we understand ourselves to be bound first and foremost along the dimension of national identity, and that we share an understanding of what precisely our interests are. They are also flattening what might be a robust understanding of ourselves and our interests into a nationalistic and/or plutocratic materialism. None of these assumptions match reality. What this narrative forecloses is the possibility of alternative ways of imagining ourselves as bound to others (whether along dimensions of class or gender solidarity, or a cosmopolitan commitment to global citizenship). In short, when we are cajoled into accepting a policy that supports Libyan rebels and renegotiates debt in Egypt but leaves Bahrainis to the wolves and shrugs its shoulders at that incomprehensible Yemen, it is because we have tacitly accepted a narrow definition of “ourselves” – as Americans principally interested in the projection of US power and the cultivation of regimes that we can influence, irrespective of how they are constituted. Each of us – individually, through myriad institutional and communicative channels – can help to rework the forms of solidarity that will enable a more (consistently) progressive policy toward the popular uprisings in the Middle East. After all, we may not all be Khalid Sa’id or Manal al-Sharif, but we can do more to show our support for what they have come to represent.

#### State engagement is a good method ---- refusal to engage in the methodical politics of democratic citizenship makes every impact inevitable.

Dietz, Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies Program at Northwestern University, ‘94

[Mary, “’THE SLOW BORING OF HARD BOARDS’: METHODICAL THINKING AND THE WORK OF POLITICS”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 4 December 1994, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2082713.pdf>]

Earlier, in considering the means-end category in politics, I suggested that everything hinges upon the action context within which this mode of thinking takes place. I now want to suggest that there is a richer conceptual context-beyond utilitarian objectification, rational capitalist accumulation, and/or Leninism-within which to think about the category of means and ends. Weil offers this alternative in her account of methodical thinking as (1) problem- oriented, (2) directed toward enacting a plan or method (solutions) in response to problems identified, (3) attuned to intelligent mastery (not domination), and (4) purposeful but not driven by a single end or success. Although Weil did not even come close to doing this herself, we might derive from her account of methodical thinking an action concept of politics. Methodical politics is equally opposed to the ideological politics Hannah Arendt deplores, but it is also distinct in important respects from the theatrical politics she defends. Identifying a problem-or what the philosopher David Wiggins calls "the search for the **best specification** of what would honor or answer to relevant concerns" (1978, 145)-is where methodical politics begins.26 It continues (to extrapolate from Weil's image of the methodical builders) in the determination of a means-end sequel, or method, directed toward a political aim. It reaches its full realization in the actual undertaking of the plan of action, or method, itself. To read any of these action aspects as falling under technical rules or blueprints (as Arendt tends to do when dealing with means and ends) is to confuse problem solving with object making and something methodical with something ideological. By designating a problem orientation to political activity, methodical politics assigns value to the activity of constantly deploying "knowing and doing" on new situations or on new understandings of old ones. This is neither an ideological exercise in repetition nor the insistent redeployment of the same pattern onto shifting circumstances and events. The problem orientation that defines methodical politics rests upon a recognition of the political domain as a matrix of obstacles where it is impossible to secure an ideological fix or a single focus. In general, then, methodical politics is best under- stood from the perspective of "the fisherman battling 880 American Political Science Review Vol. 88, No. 4 against wind and waves in his little boat" (Weil 1973, 101) or perhaps as Michael Oakeshott puts it: "In political activity . . . men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor ap- pointed destination" (1962, 127).27 Neither Weil's nor Oakeshott's is the perspective of the Platonist, who values chiefly the modeller who constructs his ship after pre-existing Forms or the pilot-philosopher who steers his craft to port by the light of immutable Forms fixed in a starry night. In both of the Platonic images (where the polis is either an artifact for use or a conveyance to safe harbor), a single and predictable end is already to hand. Neither Weil's nor Oakeshott's images admit any equivalent finality. The same is true of methodical politics, where political phenomena present to citizens-as the high sea presents to the sailor-challenges to be identified, demands to be met, and a context of circumstances to be engaged (without blueprints). Neither the assurance of finality nor the security of certainty attends this worldly activity. In his adamantly instrumental reading of politics in the ancient world, M.I. Finley makes a similar point and distinguishes between a problem orientation and patterned predictability by remarking upon the "iron compulsion" the Greeks and Romans were under "to be continuously inventive, as new and often unantic- ipated problems or difficulties arose that had to be resolved without the aid of precedents or models" (1983, 53). With this in mind, we might appreciate methodical politics as a mode of action oriented toward problems and solutions within a context of adventure and unfamiliarity. In this sense, it is compatible with Arendt's emancipatory concept of natality (or "new beginnings") and her appreciation of openness and unpredictability in the realm of human affairs. There are other neighborly affinities between methodical and theatrical politics as well. Both share a view of political actors as finite and fragile creatures who face an infinite range of possibilities, with only limited powers of control and imagination over the situations in which they are called upon to act. From both a methodical and a theatrical vantage point, this perpetual struggle that is politics, whatever its indeterminacy and flux, acquires meaning only when "knowing what to do and doing it" are united in the same performance (Arendt, 1958a, 223). Freedom, in other words, is realized when Plato's brilliant and devious conceptual maneuver is outwitted by a politics that opposes "the escape from action into rule" and reasserts human self-realization as the unification of thought-action in the world (pp. 223-25). In theatrical politics, however, the actual action content of citizen "knowing and doing" is **upstaged** by the spectacular appearance of personal identities courageously revealed in the public realm. Thus Plato's maneuver is outwitted in a bounded space where knowing what to do and doing it are disclosed in speech acts and deeds of self-revelation in the company of one's-fellow citizens. In contrast, methodical politics doggedly reminds us that **purposes themselves are what matter** in the end, and that citizen action is as much about obstinately pursuing them as it is about the courage to speak in performance. So, in methodical politics, the Platonic split between knowing and doing is overcome in a kind of boundless navigation that is realized in purposeful acts of collective self-determination. Spaces of appearances are indispensable in this context, but these spaces are not exactly akin to "islands in a sea or as oases in a desert" (Arendt 1970, 279). The parameters of methodical politics are more fluid than this, set less by identifiable boundaries than by the very activity through which citizens "let realities work upon" them with "inner concentration and calmness" (Weber 1946, 115). In this respect, methodical politics is not a context wherein courage takes eloquent respite from the face of life, danger (the sea, the desert), or death: it is a daily confrontation wherein obstacles or dangers (including the ultimate danger of death) are transformed into prob- lems, problems are rendered amenable to possible action, and action is undertaken with an aim toward solution. Indeed, in these very activities, or what Arendt sometimes pejoratively calls the in order to, we might find the perpetuation of what she praises as the for the sake of which, or the perpetuation of politics itself (1958a, 154). To appreciate the **emancipatory dimension** of this action concept of politics as methodical, we might now briefly return to the problem that Arendt and Weil think most vexes the modern world-the deformation of human beings and human affairs by forces of automatism. This is the complex manipulation of modern life that Havel describes as the situation in which everything "must be cossetted together as firmly as possible, **predetermined, regulated and controlled**" and "every aberration from the prescribed course of life is **treated as error, license and anarchy**" (1985, 83). Constructed against this symbolic animal laborans, Arendt's space of appearances is the agonistic opposite of the distorted counterfeit reality of automatism. The space of appearances is where individuality and personal identity are **snatched from the jaws of automatic processes** and recuperated in "the merciless glare" of the public realm (Arendt 1969, 86). Refigured in this fashion, Arendtian citizens counter reductive technological complexes in acts of individual speech revelation that powerfully proclaim, in collective effect, "This is who we are!" A politics in this key does indeed dramatically defy the objectifying processes of modern life-and perhaps even narratively transcends them by delivering up what is necessary for the reification of human remembrance in the "storybook of mankind" (Arendt 1958a, 95). But these are also its limits. For whatever else it involves, Arendtian politics cannot entail the practical confrontation of the situation that threatens the human condition most. Within the space of appearances, Arendt's citizens can neither search for the best specification of the problem before them nor, it seems, pursue solutions to the problem once it is identified, for such activities involve "the pursuit of a definite aim which can be set by practical considerations," and that is homo faber's prerogative and so in the province of "fabrication," well outside the space of appearances where means and ends are left behind (pp. 170-71). Consequently, automatism can be conceptualized as a "danger sign" in Arendt's theory, but it cannot be designated as a problem in Arendt's politics, a problem that citizens could cognitively counter and purposefully attempt to resolve or transform (p. 322). From the perspective of methodical politics, which begins with a **problem orientation, automatism can be specified and encountered within the particular spaces** or circumstances (schools, universities, hospitals, factories, corporations, prisons, laboratories, houses of finance, the home, public arenas, public agencies) upon which its technological processes intrude. Surely something like this is what Weil has in mind when she calls for "a sequence of mental efforts" in the drawing up of "an inventory of modern civilization" that begins by "**refusing** **to subordinate one's own destiny to the course of history**" (1973, 123-24). Freedom is immanent in such moments of cognitive inventory, in the **collective citizen-work** of "taking stock"-identifying problems and originating methods-and in the shared pursuit of purposes and objectives. This is simply what it means to think and act methodically in spaces of appearances. Nothing less, as Wiggins puts it, "can rescue and preserve civilization from the mounting irrationality of the public province, . . . from Oppression exercised in the name of Management (to borrow Simone Weil's prescient phrase)" (1978, 146).

#### Tying our individual objections to congressional action is the only way to check presidential tyranny

Kleinerman, Ph.D. in Political Science from Michigan State University, 2009 [Benjamin, The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power, p. 10-11]

If the people were sufficiently vigilant against the abuse of executive discretion, it would not be as dangerous to constitutionalism. Although there would always be danger that presidents would exercise their discretionary power arbitrarily, sufficient popular vigilance about remaining within the rule of law would, in the first place, discourage presidents from risking it unless the necessity were manifest and indisputable, and, in the second place, allow the constitutional system to respond to presidents if, they were abusing their power. Much of the problem, as I will explore in this book, stems not from the fact that discretionary executive power can be arbitrary but from the fact that the people do not naturally care whether it is. Because of popular apathy, the control of executive discretion requires a certain degree of what might be called elite cueing. The constitutionalization of discretionary executive power must be enforced by oppositional legislative elites who constantly seek to expose to citizens the executive's breach of their original Constitution. The check against the abuse of executive power comes not directly from the people themselves but from the opposition's constitutional authority

to contest the constitutionality of any given discretionary action taken by the eaq2xecutive.¶ To defend its constitutionality, the president must now show the absolute necessity of executive discretion. In doing so, this power that originates outside the Constitution comes into the Constitution; it becomes constitutionalized. Stating this position, Lincoln writes, "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation" (The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, hereafter cited in the text as CWAL followed by the volume number and page number) 41 Because these measures begin outside the Constitution, neither their necessity nor their constitutionality is assumed. Instead, the executive must prove, or at least attempt to prove, that they were in fact necessary to the preservation of the nation. The politics of constitutional necessity tame the danger executive discretion poses to the constitutional order. Moreover, citizens become more constitutional and more political as they are invited to judge. The people's natural state must be counteracted by auxiliary precautions, oppositional legislators who have a written constitution by which they can cue and signal citizens regarding executive malfeasance and abuse. Oppositional legislators might insist, for instance, that executives do not have the right simply to take the country to war without a declaration of war from Congress. Absent congressional opposition to presidential wars, the people might tend not to be opposed to them. But the Constitution specifically gives Congress the power to declare war so as to allow the president's opposition in Congress the ability to cue the public regarding the executive usurpation of a power that is rightfully that of Congress. If some emergency required a president to take the nation to war without prior congressional approval, then the constitutionality of those actions could be immediately called into question. The president must prove to Congress and by extension to the people that there really was such an emergency. In giving Congress the power to declare war, the Constitution forces presidents to make the case strongly if they decide to ignore the Constitution's dictate.¶

## 2AC

### Abolitionist Pedagogy K

#### Tying our individual objections to congressional action is the only way to check presidential tyranny

Kleinerman, Ph.D. in Political Science from Michigan State University, 2009 [Benjamin, The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power, p. 10-11]

If the people were sufficiently vigilant against the abuse of executive discretion, it would not be as dangerous to constitutionalism. Although there would always be danger that presidents would exercise their discretionary power arbitrarily, sufficient popular vigilance about remaining within the rule of law would, in the first place, discourage presidents from risking it unless the necessity were manifest and indisputable, and, in the second place, allow the constitutional system to respond to presidents if, they were abusing their power. Much of the problem, as I will explore in this book, stems not from the fact that discretionary executive power can be arbitrary but from the fact that the people do not naturally care whether it is. Because of popular apathy, the control of executive discretion requires a certain degree of what might be called elite cueing. The constitutionalization of discretionary executive power must be enforced by oppositional legislative elites who constantly seek to expose to citizens the executive's breach of their original Constitution. The check against the abuse of executive power comes not directly from the people themselves but from the opposition's constitutional authority

to contest the constitutionality of any given discretionary action taken by the eaq2xecutive.¶ To defend its constitutionality, the president must now show the absolute necessity of executive discretion. In doing so, this power that originates outside the Constitution comes into the Constitution; it becomes constitutionalized. Stating this position, Lincoln writes, "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation" (The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, hereafter cited in the text as CWAL followed by the volume number and page number) 41 Because these measures begin outside the Constitution, neither their necessity nor their constitutionality is assumed. Instead, the executive must prove, or at least attempt to prove, that they were in fact necessary to the preservation of the nation. The politics of constitutional necessity tame the danger executive discretion poses to the constitutional order. Moreover, citizens become more constitutional and more political as they are invited to judge. The people's natural state must be counteracted by auxiliary precautions, oppositional legislators who have a written constitution by which they can cue and signal citizens regarding executive malfeasance and abuse. Oppositional legislators might insist, for instance, that executives do not have the right simply to take the country to war without a declaration of war from Congress. Absent congressional opposition to presidential wars, the people might tend not to be opposed to them. But the Constitution specifically gives Congress the power to declare war so as to allow the president's opposition in Congress the ability to cue the public regarding the executive usurpation of a power that is rightfully that of Congress. If some emergency required a president to take the nation to war without prior congressional approval, then the constitutionality of those actions could be immediately called into question. The president must prove to Congress and by extension to the people that there really was such an emergency. In giving Congress the power to declare war, the Constitution forces presidents to make the case strongly if they decide to ignore the Constitution's dictate.¶

#### Institutions are inevitable – have to work through them in order to solve the impacts of the kritik

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### Policy debate is good for education, the development of empathy, and producing real world engagement from participants. Clear rules, a stable topic, and institutional role playing and simulation are integral to the process. The things you criticize about debate make it a unique exercise in active learning.

Lantis 8 (Jeffrey S. Lantis is Professor in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the International Relations Program at The College of Wooster, “The State of the Active Teaching and Learning Literature”, http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/ thestateoftheactiveteachingandlearningliterature\_sample.pdf)

Simulations, games, and role-play represent a third important set of active teaching and learning approaches. Educational objectives include deepening conceptual understandings of a particular phenomenon, sets of interactions, or socio-political processes by using student interaction to bring abstract concepts to life. They provide students with a real or imaginary environment within which to act out a given situation (Crookall 1995; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; Kaufman 1998; Jefferson 1999; Flynn 2000; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Thomas 2002; Shellman and Turan 2003; Hobbs and Moreno 2004; Wheeler 2006; Kanner 2007; Raymond and Sorensen 2008). The aim is to enable students to actively experience, rather than read or hear about, the “constraints and motivations for action (or inaction) experienced by real players” (Smith and Boyer 1996:691), or to think about what they might do in a particular situation that the instructor has dramatized for them. As Sutcliffe (2002:3) emphasizes, “Remote theoretical concepts can be given life by placing them in a situation with which students are familiar.” Such exercises capitalize on the strengths of active learning techniques: creating memorable experiential learning events that tap into multiple senses and emotions by utilizing visual and verbal stimuli. Early examples of simulations scholarship include works by Harold Guetzkow and colleagues, who created the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in the 1950s. This work sparked wider interest in political simulations as teaching and research tools. By the 1980s, scholars had accumulated a number of sophisticated simulations of international politics, with names like “Crisis,” “Grand Strategy,” “ICONS,” and “SALT III.” More recent literature on simulations stresses opportunities to reflect dynamics faced in the real world by individual decision makers, by small groups like the US National Security Council, or even global summits organized around international issues, and provides for a focus on contemporary global problems (Lantis et al. 2000; Boyer 2000). Some of the most popular simulations involve modeling international organizations, in particular United Nations and European Union simulations (Van Dyke et al. 2000; McIntosh 2001; Dunn 2002; Zeff 2003; Switky 2004; Chasek 2005). Simulations may be employed in one class meeting, through one week, or even over an entire semester. Alternatively, they may be designed to take place outside of the classroom in local, national, or international competitions. The scholarship on the use of games in international studies sets these approaches apart slightly from simulations. For example, Van Ments (1989:14) argues that games are structured systems of competitive play with specific defined endpoints or solutions that incorporate the material to be learnt. They are similar to simulations, but contain specific structures or rules that dictate what it means to “win” the simulated interactions. Games place the participants in positions to make choices that 10 affect outcomes, but do not require that they take on the persona of a real world actor. Examples range from interactive prisoner dilemma exercises to the use of board games in international studies classes (Hart and Simon 1988; Marks 1998; Brauer and Delemeester 2001; Ender 2004; Asal 2005; Ehrhardt 2008) A final subset of this type of approach is the role-play. Like simulations, roleplay places students within a structured environment and asks them to take on a specific role. Role-plays differ from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a set of well-defined preferences or objectives, role-plays provide more leeway for students to think about how they might act when placed in the position of their slightly less well-defined persona (Sutcliffe 2002). Role-play allows students to create their own interpretation of the roles because of role-play’s less “goal oriented” focus. The primary aim of the role-play is to dramatize for the students the relative positions of the actors involved and/or the challenges facing them (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This dramatization can be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such as role-playing numerous actors interconnected within a network). The reality of the scenario and its proximity to a student’s personal experience is also flexible. While few examples of effective roleplay that are clearly distinguished from simulations or games have been published, some recent work has laid out some very useful role-play exercises with clear procedures for use in the international studies classroom (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston 2003; Krain and Shadle 2006; Williams 2006; Belloni 2008). Taken as a whole, the applications and procedures for simulations, games, and role-play are well detailed in the active teaching and learning literature. Experts recommend a set of core considerations that should be taken into account when designing effective simulations (Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis 1998; Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These include building the simulation design around specific educational objectives, carefully selecting the situation or topic to be addressed, establishing the needed roles to be played by both students and instructor, providing clear rules, specific instructions and background material, and having debriefing and assessment plans in place in advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs published and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted (or adapted for use) depending upon an instructor’s educational objectives (Beriker and Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; Lowry 1999; Boyer 2000; Kille 2002; Shaw 2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is growing attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars have found that these methods are particularly effective in bridging the gap between academic knowledge and everyday life. Such exercises also lead to enhanced student interest in the topic, the development of empathy, and acquisition and retention of knowledge.

#### Perm: do both

#### The permutation solves best. An intersectional approach towards race and the fear of Islam incorporates the historical legacy of racism while understanding the particularities of contemporary racism.

Naber, Women’s Studies Professor at the University of Michigan, ‘8

[Nadine, “"Look, Mohammed the Terrorist Is Coming!" Cultural Racism, Nation-Based Racism, and the Intersectionality of Oppressions after 9/11”, The Scholar and Feminist Online, Issue 6, No. 3, Summer 2008, RSR]

In response to the post-September 11th backlash, the category "Arab, Muslim, South Asian" has been incorporated into liberal U.S. multicultural discourses. Consider, for example, diversity initiatives that have operated to single out Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians as the only "targeted communities" in the post-9/11 moment.[21] In such instances, terms such as "targeted communities" have reinforced a multicultural rainbow where specific marginalized groups are associated with specific historical moments while occluding the historical circumstances that produce oppression, marginality, and institutionalized racism, and overshadowing links between groups that have shared similar histories of immigrant exclusion and racism. That many liberal immigrant-rights organizations referred to anti-immigrant policies underlying the PATRIOT Act of 2001 as an "Arab, Muslim, and South Asian" issue and "Border Protection" Bill HR4437 of 2006 as a Latino/a issue—even though both pieces of legislation affected Arabs, Muslims, South Asians, Latinos/as (and other immigrants as well as citizens), and even though the intensified anti-immigrant sentiment sparked by the aftermath of September 11 facilitated support for the HR4437—exemplifies this pattern. Transgressing liberal multicultural approaches, many racial justice activists and scholars have agreed that survivors of 9/11-related federal government policies and incidents of harassment in the public sphere tended to be Arab, Muslim, and South Asian, but that this is not an isolated case of group marginalization. A new racial justice discourse thus emerged that called attention to anti-Arab/Muslim/South Asian racism, insisted that racial justice movements take the link between U.S.-led war in Muslim majority countries and the marginalization of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the United States seriously, and linked the targeting of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians to experiences of other communities with shared histories of oppression, including, but not limited to, Japanese Americans, Filipinos, Latinos/as, and African Americans. Yet prevailing articulations of "race" within U.S. racial and ethnic studies tend to preclude comparative research and teaching on the links between the racialization of Arabs, Muslims, Middle Easterners, and South Asians and other communities that have been historically targeted by racism, colonization, and state violence. In the late 1960s, San Francisco State University was the site of the longest campus strike in the nation's history, spearheaded by the Black Students Union and the Third World Liberation Front (a coalition of the Black Students Union, the Latin American Students Organization, the Filipino-American Students Organization, and El Renacimiento, a Mexican-American student organization). This movement demanded the expansion of the college's new Black Studies Department (the nation's first), the creation of a School of Ethnic Studies, and increased recruiting and admissions of minority students. On March 21, 1969, this strike officially came to an end with the establishment of the School of Ethnic Studies, which included a focus on Asian Americans, Latinos/as and Native Americans, and an expanded Black Studies Department. This movement, based on the strategic deployment of the terms "Third World people" and "people of color," legitimized the establishment and expansion of ethnic studies programs that place communities with shared histories of oppression by the United States government at the center of study, analysis, activism, and empowerment. Yet this paradigm, which operates according to a 1960s understanding of what constitutes racism has the potential to limit our categories of analysis to those established during the height of student movements for ethnic studies in the 1960s. U.S. women of color feminisms have tended to reify these categories. Contemporary articulations of this paradigm foreclose discussions on how the meaning of "race" has continued to shift and preclude analyses of how "racism" is constantly being remade depending on the historical context. At the same time, many recent conversations within U.S. racial and ethnic studies have explored how research on emergent forms of racialization in relationship to both previous as well as new and current historical processes might contribute to historically situated conceptualizations of race and racism in a post-9/11 environment.

#### A policy focus is key to challenge structures of white supremacy.

Themba-Nixon 2k, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, a nonprofit organization helping communities use media and policy advocacy

Makani, July 31, Colorlines, Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing, Vol 3.2)

 “This is all about policy," a woman complained to me in a recent conversation. "I'm an organizer." The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. **Policy is for** wonks, sell-out politicians, and **ivory-tower eggheads**. **Organizing is what real**, grassroots **people do**. Common as it may be, **this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world**. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. **Given who's usually present**, **most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites**. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, **policies are the codification of power relationships** and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, **if organizing is about changing the rules and building power**, **how can organizing be separated from policies**? **Can we** really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or **win racial justice without contesting** the rules and the rulers, **the policies and the policymakers**? **The answer is no**-and double no **for people of color**. Today, **racism subtly dominates** nearly every aspect of **policymaking**. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the **lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to** uneven enforcement and even **discriminatory implementation of policies**. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing **progressive initiatives** in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will **require careful attention to the mechanics of** local **policymaking** and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. **By getting into the policy arena** in a proactive manner, **we can take our demands to the next level**. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, **this work requires** a certain amount of **interaction with** "the suits," as well as struggles with **the bureaucracy**, **the technical language**, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, **policy work is** just one tool in our box

#### Exclusive focus on racial groups are bad – only the permutation allows for an integration of perspective that’s key to solve oppression.

Ogbuagu, Professor in Social Work at the University of Saint Francis, ‘13

[Buster, “Constructing America’s “New Blacks:” Post 9/11 Social Policies and their Impacts on and Implications for the Lived Experiences of Muslims, Arabs and “Others””, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol 4, Issue 1, January 2013, RSR]

8.3. Patience and Resilience The current construction of “New Blacks” in Arabs, Muslims and “Others,” just like most forms of discrimination and oppression have a shelf life and will one day soon come to an end, at least for the current recipients of the discrimination and harassment. It is a historical fact that during the periods of national emergencies, the majority population tends to find common tantrumic grounds with the minorities amongst them.United States history abounds with multi-ethnicities such as the Irish, Jews, Italians, Japanese and Chinese, who underwent persecution just for the mere fact of their ethnicities. They are all now mainstreamed and thriving as Americans and have become the majority population who currently has become the producers and reproducers of oppression against other minorities. Although it is unlikely that the “Othering” of Blacks in America will ever end even with the election and reelection of President Obama, who is routinely and whimsically demanded by Donald Trump and American “birthers,” to produce his birth certificate and other evidences as they consider him an outsider, Black experiences with discrimination appear to be ebbing somewhat. The reason for advising caution and patience with the current scapegoats is that the way we have come to know America, it may not be long before another set of “New Blacks” are identified and constructed and routinized, a situation that stands to provide the much needed relief from the negative attention that the Arabs, Muslims and “Others” within our society currently face. 8.4. Positive outcomes of 9/11 According to Clay (2011) 9/11 was devastating to Americans and others alike. However, it has also imparted a strong and invaluable lesson in Civil Rights to those, not Black Americans and not Whites, who thought previously that they were immune from subordination, therefore above the Civil Rights fray, because, as they believed, those matters only pertained to Blacks and African Americans . An Indian Muslim opined that prior to the 9/11 mayhem, Muslims and Arabs, as well as Indians and those of South Asia, especially ones that occupied a higher socioeconomic echelon did not feel that prejudice, discrimination and the entire racial discourse was a part of their existence and life construct. They expressed an unwillingness to stand with Blacks against the oppression that they were enduring and refused to participate in Civil or Human Rights struggles most of which they witnessed within or outside the boundaries of America. Now they believe that they know better, as the discourses of subordination transcends race and ethnicity, exposing their own inclusion and adequacy mirages. Now, they understandand state that even the younger generation has joined and has shifted attention to their identity, rights and civil engagement by asserting themselves as Americans first and Muslim- Americans second. 9. Conclusion and final thoughts Like Pearl Harbor before it, the terrorist events of 9/11 will remain indelible in the minds and psyche of all those who witnessed it, all Americans and those who have been sieged by some of the policies that were created to prevent further acts of terror against Americans. For better or for worse, the events of the 9/11 have changed not only America, but the whole world, including the ways we think, perceive and act. One of the ways that terrorist activities changed the world as we knew it was in the way America chose to protect itself. It used immigration, profiling, covert and overt surveillance of its citizenry, especially minority groups as represented by Arabs, Muslims and “Others” who have been lumped in the same category for fitting profiles that were created by the Department of Homeland Security. Tensions apparently are beginning to relax somewhat, especially following the abrogation of some of the tenets of the PATRIOT Act, such as a section of NSEERS in 2011 re quiring nonimmigrant persons to register when they depart. However, the time it takes for its impact to be felt within the rank and file of security agencies at the airports and borders may be protracted. To this extent, those who are disproportionately impacted by the policies may not only have to be patient, but exercise constraints, a lot of it in the way they think, act or even associate with others, especially those who may harbor grudges against America. One of the key elements in reducing unwanted and painful contact with the security agencies is in compliance, for most of those who work here are simply following orders, despite the fact that a few may be engaged in an ego trip, due to the enormous powers that the Act has assigned to them. For in this, cooperation with the procedure is a form of prosocial resistance, which will go a long way to easing the tension and other unsavory outcomes more than any other form of resistance . The major solace is that eventually the unsavory experiences of those who are the disproportionate targets of the post 9/11 policy may soon be mainstreamed when other events may necessitate America’s construction of other “New Blacks”.

#### Focusing upon the traumatic elements of black subjectivity denies the agency present within black attempts at thwarting white supremacy and domination. Specifically, this prevents them from resolving issues of indefinite detention that is promoted by structures constituted by whiteness.

Walker 12 (Tracey, Graduate of Psychosocial Studies at Birbeck University of London, Graduate Journal of Social Science July 2012, Vol. 9, Issue 2, " The Future of Slavery: From Cultural Trauma to Ethical Remembrance" http://gjss.org/images/stories/volumes/9/2/Walker%20Article.pdf)

To argue that there is more to the popular conception of slaves as victims who experienced social death within the abusive regime of transatlantic slavery is not to say that these subjectivities did not exist. When considering the institution of slavery we can quite confidently rely on the assumption that it did indeed de- stroy the self-hood and the lives of millions of Africans. Scholar Vincent Brown (2009) however, has criticised Orlando Patterson’s (1982) seminal book Slavery and Social Death for positioning the slave as a subject without agency and maintains that those who managed to dislocate from the nightmare of plantation life ‘were not in fact the living dead’, but ‘the mothers of gasping new societies’ (Brown 2009, 1241).¶ The Jamaican Maroons were one such disparate group of Africans who managed to band together and flee the Jamaican plantations in or- der to create a new mode of living under their own rule.

These ‘run- aways’ were in fact ‘ferocious fight- ers and master strategists’, building towns and military bases which en- abled them to fight and successfully win the war against the British army after 200 years of battle (Gotlieb 2000,16). In addition, the story of the Windward Jamaican Maroons disrupts the phallocentricism in- herent within the story of the slave ‘hero’ by the very revelation that their leader, ‘Queen Nanny’ was a woman (Gotlieb 2000). As a leader, she was often ignored by early white historians who dismissed her as an ‘old hagg’ or ‘obeah’ woman (possessor of evil magic powers) (Gotlieb 2000, xvi). Yet, despite these negative descriptors, Nanny presents an interesting image of an African woman in the time of slavery who cultivated an exceptional army and used psychological as well as military force against the English despite not owning sophisticated weapons (Gotlieb 2000). As an oral tale, her story speaks to post-slavery generations through its representa- tion of a figure whose gender defy- ing acts challenged the patriarchal fantasies of the Eurocentric imagi- nary and as such ‘the study of her experiences might change the lives of people living under paternalistic, racist, classist and gender based oppression’ (Gotlieb 2000, 84).¶ The label of ‘social death’ is re- jected here on the grounds that it is a narrative which is positioned from the vantage point of a European hegemonic ideology. Against the social symbolic and its gaze, black slaves were indeed regarded as non-humans since their lives were stunted, diminished and deemed less valuable in comparison to the Europeans. However, Fanon’s (1967) assertion that ‘not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man’ (Fanon 1967, 110) helps us to un- derstand that this classification can only have meaning relative to the symbolic which represents the alive-ness of whiteness against the back- drop of the dead black slave (Dyer 1997). Butler (2005) makes it clear that the ‘death’ one suffers relative to the social symbolic is imbued with the fantasy that having constructed the Other and interpellated her into ‘life’, one now holds the sovereignty of determining the subject’s right to live or die: ¶ this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of sub- ject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of the fan- tasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had, in other words it is a necessary grief (Butler 2005, 65).¶ The point to make here is that al- though the concept of social death has proved useful for theorists to de- scribe the metaphysical experience of those who live antagonistically in relation to the social symbolic, it is nevertheless a colonial narrative within which the slaves are confined to a one dimensional story of terror. In keeping with Gilroy’s (1993b) argument that the memory of slav- ery must be constructed from the slaves’ point of view, we might in- stead concentrate, not on the way in which the slaves are figured within the European social imaginary, but on how they negotiated their own ideas about self and identity. We might therefore find some value in studying a group like the Maroons who not only managed to create an autonomous world outside of the¶ hegemonic discourse which ne- gated them, but also, due to their unique circumstances, were forced to create new modes of communi- cation which would include a myriad of African cultures, languages and creeds (Gottlieb 2000). This cre- ative and resistive energy of slave subjectivity not only disrupts the colonial paradigm of socially dead slaves, but also implies the ethical tropes of creation, renewal and mu- tual recognition.¶ In contrast, the passive slave proved to feature heavily in the 2007 bicentenary commemorations causing journalist Toyin Agbetu to interrupt the official speeches and exclaim that it had turned into a discourse of freedom engineered mostly by whites with stories of black agency excluded8. Young’s argu- ment that ‘one of the damaging side effects of the focus on white peo- ple’s role in abolition is that Africans are represented as being passive in the face of oppression’, appears to echo the behaviour in the UK today given that a recent research poll re- veals that the black vote turnout is significantly lower than for the white majority electorate and that forty percent of second generation ‘immi- grants’ believe that voting ‘doesn’t matter’.9 Yet, Gilroy (1993a) argues that this political passivity may not simply be a self fulfilling prophecy, but might allude to the ‘lived contra- diction’ of being black and English which affects one’s confidence about whether opinions will be validated in a society that, at its core, still holds on to the fantasy of European supe- riority (Gilroy 1993a). Without con- sidering the slaves’ capacity for sur- vival and their fundamental role in overthrowing the European regime of slavery, we limit the use–value of the memory and risk becoming overly attached to singular slave subjectivities seeped in death and passivity. The Maroons story how- ever, enables slave consciousness to rise above the mire of slavery’s abject victims and establishes an ethical relation with our ancestors who lived and survived in the time of slavery.

## 1AR

### K

#### The aff establishes standards of fairness for detainees – gets out of your generic prison indicts.

David Welsh 11, J.D. from the University of Utah, “Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair Treatment of Detainees on Perceptions of Global Legitimacy”, http://law.unh.edu/assets/images/uploads/publications/unh-law-review-vol-09-no2-welsh.pdf

DTC = Domestic Terror Court

To further improve perceptions of U.S. consistency, I suggest: (1) that traditional rules of law may need to be modified, but cannot be abruptly discarded in periods of crisis; (2) a general uniformity among military commissions must exist as required by the U.S. Su- preme Court; and (3) detainees of different nations, ethnicities, and religions must be given equal treatment and equal rights. The DTC model addresses each of these three concerns. First, the DTC model sets a clear standard of consistency in con- trast to current ad hoc policies that have fluctuated in the political winds of this crisis and have been vaguely applied. The DTC model provides clear definitions and specific criteria for determining who is a threat based on information that is “(1) reliable; (2) viable; (3) valid; and (4) corroborated.” 115 When individuals are not on notice about how they will be treated, they respond negatively when the law appears to implicate their conduct without adequate warning. 116 Outside observers such as human rights groups and citizens of other nations will similarly be dissatisfied by a system that generates un- predictable results. Second, the DTC model provides a system of uniformity as re- quired by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,117 the Court proclaimed the need for a uniform system of courts-martial and military commission procedures. 118 As a result, procedural rules must be consistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and rules must be the same between military commissions and courts- martial “insofar as practicable.” 119 The DTC model proposes un- iformity in terms of sentencing as well as procedure. Like the U.S. criminal justice system, the DTC model utilizes maximum and min- imum sentencing terms. 120 Additionally, the DTC model rejects the death penalty in all cases rather than providing exceptions to the citi- zens of certain nations. 121 Third, the DTC model provides the same treatment for citizens and non-citizens. A 2006 poll suggests that even Americans gener- ally do not feel that their fellow citizens deserve preferential treat- ment. 122 Sixty-three percent of respondents indicated that the deten- tion policies should be the same for citizens and non-citizens, while 33% felt that policies should be different. 123 When granting U.S. citizens additional rights that are not applied to individuals of other nations, a tradeoff is clearly being made. One of the fears surround- ing U.S. treatment of foreign detainees is that other nations will reciprocate by treating U.S. prisoners with disrespect.124 The application of standard rights and procedures to similarly situated individuals under the DTC model comports with universal conceptions of fair- ness and also enhances the next procedural justice factor: bias sup- pression.

#### Optimism produces joy that makes radical, collective political struggle possible—their advocacy causes disengagement which turns their impacts and destroys value to life

Jensen 1 (Robert Jensen is Professor of Journalism @ University of Texas, Austin. “Critical Hope: Radical Citizenship in Reactionary Times,” 12-17-01, http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~rjensen/freelance/attack20.htm)

Just as we have to distinguish between critique and cynicism, we have to realize that hope is not synonymous with optimism. I am hopeful, but I am not necessarily always optimistic, at least not about the short-term possibilities. These systems and structures of power, these illegitimate structures of authority, are deeply entrenched. They will not be dislodged easily or quickly. Optimism and pessimism should hang on questions of fact -- we should be optimistic when the facts argue for optimism.¶ For example, I am against the illegitimate structure of authority called the corporation. I want to see different forms of economic organization emerge. I am hopeful about the possibilities but not optimistic that in my lifetime I will see the demise of capitalism, corporations, and wage slavery. Still, I will do certain things to work toward that.¶ The same can be said of the problem of U.S. aggression against innocent people in the rest of the world, particularly these days in Afghanistan, where the aggression is most intense. Given the bloody record of the United States in the past 50 years and the seemingly limitless capacity of U.S. officials to kill without conscience, I must confess I am not optimistic that such aggression will stop anytime soon, in large part because those corporate structures that drive the killing are still around. But I will do certain things to work against it.¶ Or take the large state research university. I am concerned about how the needs of students are systematically ignored and the needs of corporate funders are privileged, how critical thinking is squashed not by accident but by design. I am concerned about the illegitimate structures of authority that I work in and that compel me to act in ways against the interests of students. I am not optimistic that the structure of big research universities is going to change anytime soon. But I will do certain things to work against the structures.¶ So, why would I do any of those things if my expectations of short-term success are so low? One reason is that I could be wrong about my assessment of the likelihood of change. I’ve been wrong about a lot of things in my life; the list grows every day. For all I know, corporate capitalism is on the verge of collapse, and if we just keep the pressure on it will start to unravel tomorrow. Or perhaps public discontent with murderous U.S. foreign policy is just about ready to crystallize and mobilize people. Or perhaps the contradictions of these behemoth universities are becoming so apparent that the illegitimate structures of authority are about to give way to something that deserves the label “higher education.”¶ History is too complex and contingent for any of us to make predictions. We simply don’t have the intellectual tools to understand with much precision how and why people and societies change. History is a rough guide, but it offers no social-change equation. Still, there’s really no reasonable alternative except to keep plugging away. Basically, there are two choices, which are common sense but that I didn’t figure out until I heard them articulated by Noam Chomsky: We can either predict the worst -- that no change is possible -- and not act, in which case we guarantee there will be no change. Or we can understand that change always is possible, even in the face of great odds, and act on that assumption, which creates the possibility of progress. (See Chomsky’s interview with Michael Albert at http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/interviews/9301-albchomsky-2.html)¶ Every great struggle for justice in human history began as a lost cause. When Gabriel Prosser made plans to take Richmond, Virginia, in 1800, the first large-scale organized slave revolt, he was fighting a lost cause, for which he was hanged. When eight Quakers got together in 1814 in Jonesboro, Tennessee, to form the first white anti-slavery society in the United States (the Tennessee Society for the Manumission of Slaves) they were fighting a lost cause. A lost cause that eventually won.¶ But that can’t be the only answer to the question “why should I be politically active.” We are human beings, not machines, and we all have needs. It is hard to sustain yourself in difficult work if the only reward is the possibility that somewhere down the line your work may have some positive effect, though you may be long dead. That’s a lot to ask of people. We all want more than that out of life. We want joy and love. At least every now and then, we want to have a good time, including a good time while engaged in our work. No political movement can sustain itself indefinitely without understanding that, not just because people need -- and have a right -- to be happy, but because if there is no joy in it, then movements are more likely to be dangerous. The joy -- the celebration of being human and being alive in connection with others -- is what must fuel the drive for change.¶ People find joy in many different ways. As many people over the years have pointed out, one source of joy is in the struggle. I have spent a lot of time in the past few years doing political work, and some of that work isn’t terribly fun. Collating photocopies for a meeting for a progressive political cause isn’t any more fun than collating photocopies for a meeting at a marketing company. But it is different in some ways: It puts you in contact with like-minded people. It sparks conversation. It creates space in which you can think and feel your way through difficult questions. It’s a great place to laugh as you staple. It provides the context for connections that go beyond superficial acquaintanceships.¶ The joy is in the struggle, but not just because in struggle one connects to decent people. The joy is also in the pain of struggle. Joy is multilayered -- one key aspect of it is discovery, and one way we discover things about ourselves and others is through pain. Struggle confronts pain, and confronting pain is part of joy. The pain is there, in all our lives; there is no human life without pain. Pain can become part of joy when it is confronted. Struggle confronts pain. Struggle produces joy.¶ The joy is in the struggle. The struggle is not just the struggle against illegitimate structures of authority in the abstract. The struggles are in each of us -- struggles to find the facts, to analyze clearly, to imagine solutions, to join with others in collective action for justice, and struggles to understand ourselves in relation to each other and ourselves as we engage in all these activities.¶ I realize that this struggle doesn’t seem appealing to many. I have heard lots of people lately say that they can’t cope with the complexity of politics. It seems too much, too big, too confusing. All they can handle, they say, is to focus on their individual lives and do the best to fix their lives. I think these folks misunderstand not just their moral obligation but the nature of progress, individual and collective. We don’t fix ourselves in isolation. We don’t build decent lives by cutting ourselves off from problems just because they are complex. Yes, there are times when difficult situations force us to turn inward and deal with pressing problems in our lives. I have done that, and I see no need to apologize for it. But I am arguing against the permanent division of our lives into these artificial categories. Our problems are never wholly individual, and hence they can’t be fixed in individual ways. Part of the solution is always to be found in the bigger struggle, in which we all have a part.¶ I have learned that there is great joy in that bigger struggle. And that leads us back to the abandonment of cynicism and the embrace of hope. Cynicism is a sophomoric and self-indulgent retreat from the world and all its problems. Hope is a mature and loving embrace of the world and all its promise. That does not mean one should have unfounded or naive hope. Wendell Berry reminds us that history shows that “massive human failure” is possible, but:¶ “[H]ope is one of our duties. A part of our obligation to our own being and to our descendants is to study our life and our condition, searching always for the authentic underpinnings of hope. And if we look, these underpinnings can still be found.” [Sex, Economy, Freedom & Community (New York: Pantheon, 1993), p. 11.]¶ Hope is one of our duties. But that does not mean it is always easy. There are many times, especially since September 11, that I have had to struggle to hold onto hope. The combination of seeing the World Trade Center towers fall in an instance and then watching the unfolding of an illegal and immoral war on Afghanistan has tested my own sense of hope. I managed to hold on for a couple of months, but in the few days before I sat down to write this I could feel my sense of hope fading. At the same time that I have been writing and thinking about the war, I also have been continuing my work on sexual violence and pornography. Both spark the same feeling in my gut -- despair over how cruel people, especially men, can be. When I have to face humans’ willingness to inflict pain -- and ability to find pleasure in inflicting pain -- whether in the realm of the global or the intimate, some part of me wants to die; I can’t bear it. Maybe some part of me does die.¶ In the few days before I wrote this, I especially was having trouble in the mornings; lying awake in bed in the dark; trying to reclaim that sense of hope so that getting out of bed would make sense; trying not to think about the war but realizing that not thinking about it would be even worse; dying a little bit inside every morning, in the dark.¶ But those authentic underpinnings of hope remain. On the day I wrote this, I had a meeting with a student on my campus who had read something I had written about the war and wanted to talk. She said she didn’t have anything in particular to ask me. She just wanted to talk to someone who didn’t think she was crazy. All around her at work and school, people -- pro, con or neutral -- were refusing to talk about the war, she said. So we talked for a bit. We did politics, in a small way, the way politics is most often done. We talked about how she might organize a political group on campus. But maybe more important, we shored up each other’s sense of hope. We could talk about the pain and craziness of the war without turning away.¶ Real hope -- the belief in the authentic underpinnings of hope -- is radical. A belief that people are not evil and stupid, not consigned merely to live out pre-determined roles in illegitimate structures of authority, is radical. The willingness to act publicly on that hope and that belief is radical.¶ We all live in a society that would prefer that we not be radical, that we not understand any of this. We live in a society that prefers productive but passive people. I work at a university that is part of that society, and has many of the same problems. Many classes at the university are either explicitly or implicitly designed to convince students that everything I have argued here is fundamentally loony. The same goes for much of what comes to us through the commercial mass media. Some of what I say indeed may be misguided; as I said, I understand that I could be, and often am, wrong.¶ But, even if I’m wrong in some ways, I’d rather be wrong with hope than cynicism. I’d rather be naive than hip. I’d rather work for a just and sustainable world and fail than abandon the hope. I understand that this position is not wholly logical; it is based on a sense of how we can best make good on the gifts that come with being part of the human community. It is based on a faith in something common to us all, a capacity that is difficult to name, but which is perhaps best summed up by a phrase once used by the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. Our task simply put, Freire said, is “to change some conditions that appear to me as obviously against the beauty of being human.” [Myles Horton and Paulo Freire, We Make the Road by Walking (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p. 131.]